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G
ene drive organisms (GDOs), whose 
genomes have been genetically en-
gineered to spread a desired allele 
through a population, have the po-
tential to transform the way societ-
ies address a wide range of daunting 
public health and environmental chal-
lenges. The development, testing, and re-
lease of GDOs, however, are complex and 
often controversial. A key challenge is to 
clarify the appropriate roles of developers 
and others actively engaged in work with 
GDOs in decision-making processes, and, 
in particular, how to establish partner-
ships with relevant authorities and other 
stakeholders. Several members of the gene 
drive community previously proposed safe-
guards for laboratory experiments with 
GDOs (1) that, in the absence of national or 
international guidelines, were considered 
essential for responsible laboratory work 
to proceed. Now, with GDO development 
advancing in laboratories (2–5), we envi-
sion similar safeguards for the potential 
next step: ecologically and/or genetically 
confined field trials to further assess the 
performance of GDOs. A GDO’s propen-
sity to spread necessitates well-developed 
criteria for field trials to assess its poten-
tial impacts (6). We, as a multidisciplinary 
group of GDO developers, ecologists, con-
servation biologists, and experts in social 
science, ethics, and policy, outline com-
mitments below that we deem critical for 
responsible conduct of a field trial and to 
ensure that these technologies, if they are 
introduced, serve the public interest.
A broad array of GDOs are in develop-
ment, including those that are geographi-
cally localized, nonlocalized, temporally 
self-limiting, and self-propagating (see the 
first table). CRISPR/Cas9-based editing has 
expanded not only the types of GDOs that 
are possible (2–5) but also the societal chal-
lenges they may help to solve. In particu-
lar, major threats to human health may be 
eliminated by reducing the viability of and/
or inducing resistance to pathogens in mos-
quitoes such as Aedes spp. (major vectors of 
dengue, chikungunya, and Zika viruses) and 
Anopheles spp. (major vectors of malaria 
parasites), or in white-footed mice (carriers 
of the Lyme disease bacterium). GDOs for 
suppression of pest populations could also 
contribute greatly to biodiversity conserva-
tion, agricultural productivity, and human 
and animal well-being. 
The core commitments presented here 
(see the second table) are intended to ad-
dress field trials of either localized GDOs 
(i.e., GDOs that are genetically or molecu-
larly confined so that they will not spread 
indefinitely) or nonlocalized GDOs in eco-
logically isolated locations (e.g., limited-
access islands located beyond GDO disper-
sal capacity, or targeting of a private allele 
that exists only in an isolated population). 
Although determinations of whether a GDO 
is sufficiently confined and who should 
make these decisions will need to be con-
sidered for each GDO and field trial site, in-
troductions of nonlocalized GDOs into sites 
that are not ecologically isolated would be 
beyond the scope of these guidelines. We 
also recognize that these commitments are 
not enforceable in a regulatory sense; even 
so, we pledge to apply these commitments 
to our own practices, recognizing the inher-
ent complexity of this work and our intent 
to contribute to a fair and ethical culture 
of gene drive research. These commitments 
are congruent with guiding principles ad-
 BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
Core commitments for field 
trials of gene drive organisms
We must ensure that trials are scientifically, politically, and 
socially robust, publicly accountable, and widely transparent
P O L I C Y  F O RU M
Characteristics and examples of 
gene drive organisms
Two broad types of engineered approaches exist to modify 
populations; one requires gene drive and the other relies 
on non-drive technologies. Multiple examples of these types 
of systems exist, which can have varied temporal dynamics, 
including Self-Propagating (with a low threshold; predicted to 
spread from a GDO release that represents a small percentage 
of the target population), Majority Wins (with a high threshold; 
predicted to spread into a population only when the transgene 
is present in >50% of the target population), and Self-Limiting 
(temporally limited; can only spread or persist in a population 
for a short period). These systems can fall under two broad 
categories: Nonlocalized (predicted, on the basis of a lack of 
genetic/molecular confinement, to spread beyond boundaries) 
and Localized (predicted, on the basis of genetic/molecular 
confinement, to spread only within a localized population). 













killer rescue, Homer Self-Limiting
(temporally limited)
Non-drives
SIT#, RIDL#, fsRIDL#, 
pgSIT#
#Can be used for population suppression in some forms. *Although UDMEL does have a high threshold, it does not always fall under 
Majority Wins temporal dynamics. Abbreviations: Medea, maternal effect dominant embryonic arrest; TARE/TADE, toxin-antidote 
recessive embryo/toxin-antidote dominant embryo; CleaveR, Cleave and Rescue; UDMEL, maternal effect lethal underdominance; 
SIT, sterile insect technique; RIDL, release of insects carrying a dominant lethal; fsRIDL, female-specific release of insects carrying a 
dominant lethal; pgSIT, precision-guided sterile insect technique. See supplementary materials for more details and references.
See supplementary materials for author affiliations. 
Email: oakbari@ucsd.edu
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opted by several organizations with in-
terests in GDO research (6–8). We extend 
these principles specifically to decisions on 
whether and how to conduct GDO field tri-
als, which will require new and expanding 
collaborations. To become a signatory to 
these guiding principles, please visit www.
geneconvenevi.org/supporters-of-the-core-
commitments-for-field-trials/. 
Although field trials of GDOs ultimately 
will depend on public policy decisions, 
those engaged in GDO work can play 
critical roles in support of these decisions 
by generating evidence and developing 
evaluation strategies in fair and effective 
partnerships with relevant authorities 
and other stakeholders. That the authors 
of this paper are based largely in high-
income countries reflects the current re-
ality that GDO development is occurring 
primarily in such countries. However, fair 
partnership with counterparts and com-
munities in low- and middle-income coun-
tries where many GDOs have the highest 
potential for positive impact underlies 
each of our commitments, as does recogni-
tion of the need for capacity-building and 
global cooperation.
FAIR PARTNERSHIP AND TRANSPARENCY
Fair partnership among GDO developers, 
communities where GDOs may be released, 
regulators (government officials charged 
with making decisions about whether and 
how GDOs can be tested locally, even when 
the regulatory pathway for GDOs may not 
yet be fully defined), and stakeholders and 
other experts (6) is critical and will require 
substantial time and resources (9). These 
stakeholders will be engaged in all stages 
of trial preparation (10, 11) and are integral 
to partners’ understanding of existing and 
required scientific and regulatory capaci-
ties of each partner community or country 
and its political and cultural context. In 
addition, field site characteristics—such as 
disease incidence or pest exposure, vector 
or pest species distributions, and target 
population genetic background, ecology, 
and connectivity to surrounding popula-
tions—will require input from various 
stakeholders. 
This engagement will help to identify 
the best forms for multidirectional com-
munication and learning, appropriate pro-
cesses for obtaining government authori-
zation and determining community-level 
agreement, and meaningful methods to en-
sure accountability among partners. GDO 
teams and local and national partners will 
co-define and collect baseline data needed 
for each trial, and will prepare an early-
response team to address observations in 
trial-relevant measures. A media commu-
nication plan and platform for rapid dis-
semination of data and interim analyses 
to field site partners, nongovernmental 
organizations, and globally interested par-
ties (e.g., open-access journals) should be 
considered. Plans to provide information 
on progress and adjustments in the trial, 
including changes in the release strategy 
or discontinuation of the study, will be 
determined in partnership with trial-site 
community members and government au-
thorities. Transparency about funding, as 
well as coordination among members of 
more than one potential release site, is en-
couraged. In addition, we will work toward 
a global public registry for communities 
and laboratories intending to develop GDO 
applications. This presents challenges in 
design, implementation, and enforcement 
of such a registry, including the need to 
respect the amount of information dis-
closed. We commit to both these principles 
of openness and working to establish the 
tools and methods needed to facilitate fair 
partnership and transparency. We believe 
that this work will support project partner-
ships broadly but should be considered es-
sential for GDO trials. 
PRODUCT EFFICACY AND SAFETY 
Evidence of laboratory efficacy will be 
demonstrated prior to a GDO release (12). 
A draft target product profile (TPP), or 
similar format, detailing acceptable perfor-
mance parameters and characteristics of 
the GDO should be prepared by the devel-
oper in consultation with regulators [e.g., 
(13)]. Evidence of efficacy in the laboratory 
should include fitness of GDOs, effective 
release thresholds, stability (i.e., driving 
capacity maintained over generations), re-
duction in ability to transmit locally circu-
lating pathogens, and breeding trials with 
wild strains, as applicable. Results of labo-
ratory cage experiments will help to iden-
tify additional data needs.
Guidelines proposed in 2015 addressed 
important biosecurity considerations for 
laboratory-based GDO research (e.g., labo-
ratory gene drive experiments should use 
at least two stringent confinement strate-
gies) (1). With our expectation that these 
considerations will already have been ad-
dressed before moving toward field test-
ing, we focus here specifically on safety 
considerations for field testing. Tests of 
product safety should be conducted prior 
to, during, and after the release of GDOs, 
given that natural selection will function 
during each stage. Recognizing that no 
action or inaction can be entirely risk-
free, required safety levels will be jointly 
defined with partners, neighboring com-
munities, and regulatory institutions. For 
example, GDOs’ potential to damage or 
alter closely related or otherwise key spe-
cies should be examined. Results of experi-
ments assessing both efficacy and safety 
should be made publicly available within 
a reasonable time frame. We commit to co-
defining safety with trial partners and to 
openly sharing data on efficacy and safety 
of a GDO. 
REGULATORY EVALUATION AND 
RISK/BENEFIT ASSESSMENT
At a minimum, conducting GDO field tri-
als requires adherence to existing, and of-
ten evolving, national (or, in some cases, 
subnational) regulations and regional and 
international agreements. Developers will 
submit required analyses (variously known 
as risk, safety, and/or environmental as-
sessments) to regulators and respond to 
their requests, recognizing that regula-
tory pathways may still be in development. 
Trial protocols will be reviewed for ap-
proval by local ethics boards, institutional 
review boards, and/or animal care and use 
committees. Regulators may also require 
protections of communities where GDOs 
are released, such as maintaining existing 
control methods or instituting these meth-
ods as a backup to GDOs, and these protec-
tions (e.g., use of insecticides or pesticides) 
should be incorporated into trial design. 
We believe risk assessment for GDO field 
trials should include two methodological 
innovations. First, new methodologies are 
needed to assess potential social, epidemi-
ological, and ecological benefits and their 
distribution. Second, we aspire to broaden 
risk/benefit assessment and make it more 
inclusive than traditional assessments that 
rely on expert-defined health and environ-
mental risks, and to explicitly consider is-
sues that may be harder to measure, such 
as justice. A Procedurally Robust Risk 
Assessment Framework (14) is one model 
for expanding assessments to include risks 
of relevance to the social, cultural, and po-
litical context. We recognize the value of 
integrating indigenous and other types of 
local expert knowledge (15), examining so-
cioeconomic risks, and encompassing risks 
and benefits of introducing or not intro-
ducing GDOs in these assessments. 
“We pledge to apply these 
commitments to our own 
practices ... to contribute 
to a fair and ethical 
culture of gene drive research.” 
Published by AAAS
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MONITORING AND MITIGATION 
GDO developers should engage and part-
ner with communities, regulators, evolu-
tionary biologists, ecologists, and social 
scientists to prepare and participate in 
surveillance for effectiveness and safety, 
and to monitor unintended consequences 
before, during, and after release, with ac-
countability to various partners delineated 
before a field trial. Measures of GDO suc-
cess will be defined before release and may 
include evidence of continuing biological 
function (e.g., prevalence of the trans-
gene in the target population), evidence of 
elimination of the target population, and 
evidence of epidemiological, evolutionary, 
or ecological impacts related to a pathogen 
or pest. Monitoring systems will be co-de-
signed for early detection of, for example, 
inadvertent introgression of the transgene 
into neighboring populations of the tar-
get organism or select nontarget species. 
They will include collection of genetic and/
or genomic data of target species prior to 
release to be compared with post-release 
populations, so as to understand gene flow 
and genetic diversity and to character-
ize potential resistance alleles. Ecological 
studies are also critical to understanding 
breeding behavior and other key param-
eters that may affect field trial protocols. 
Early all-season modeling of releases at 
the trial site will help to inform data col-
lection goals, including the geographic and 
temporal scope of collections, with a buf-
fer zone around the immediate release site 
depending on the biological characteristics 
(e.g., dispersal range) of the target species 
and ecological isolation of the trial site. 
The length of time needed to demonstrate 
efficacy and safety of the GDO for wider 
use will be established at the beginning of 
the trial, aided by mathematical models. 
Considerations will include data needed for 
possible geographic scale-up. Monitoring 
during field trials will initially include rates 
of gene drive persistence and spread and 
will later inform epidemiological or ecologi-
cal impacts. For trials with epidemiologi-
cal endpoints, sufficient clinical capacity 
should be established early in trial design 
to assess changes in disease incidence. 
Plans for risk management—in the 
event of undesired escape of a transgene 
to neighboring communities or nontarget 
species; development of resistance in vec-
tor, pest, or pathogen; or unintended ef-
fects that persist in the population—will 
depend on the drive construct used and 
on input from communities, ecologists/
scientists, and regulators. Before trial ini-
tiation, triggers and risk management 
strategies will be clearly defined. Capacity 
for rapid community-wide use of a chosen 
vector/pest countermeasure should be es-
tablished, including stocking of chemical 
control agents (e.g., pesticides) and per-
sonnel capacity needed for implementa-
tion. The need for social remediation (i.e., 
responsiveness to social harm/disruption) 
should be addressed in the risk manage-
ment plan. Use of countermeasures such as 
self-limiting systems (see the first table) or 
drive removal technologies may be consid-
ered, with these systems made available and 
laboratory-tested, with similar framework 
and rigor, before the trial begins.
By presenting our commitments for field 
trials of GDOs, we aim to prepare for poten-
tial field trials that are scientifically, politi-
cally, and socially robust, publicly account-
able, and widely transparent. Our intent is 
to contribute to public policy decisions on 
whether and how to proceed with GDOs, 
based on evaluations conducted in fair and 
effective partnerships with relevant author-
ities and other stakeholders. We recognize 
our responsibility to work openly; we ac-
knowledge that many innovations beyond 
those in the laboratory are still needed; and 
we welcome others, including a broad array 
of stakeholders in partner countries, to join 
us in conversation about appropriate gover-
nance of this technology and to advance to-
gether equitably, safely, and responsibly. 
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Core commitments for field trials of gene drive organisms
Fair partnership and transparency
• Partner with collaborating communities, local experts, and stakeholders to increase qual-
ity of field trial design and ensure accountability
• Integrate community and stakeholder perspectives into interim analyses of field trials and 
possible considerations of trial redesign or termination
• Present timely data on open platforms and work toward a global registry for GDOs
Product efficacy and safety
• Support the establishment of acceptable performance parameters of a GDO in collabora-
tion with partner communities and regulators
• Identify sources of uncertainty and their potential influence on estimates of safety 
and efficacy
• Make efficacy and safety data publicly available
Regulatory evaluation and risk/benefit assessment
• Engage early and often with regulators, following national regulatory procedures and 
regional and international agreements to obtain ethics and regulatory approvals
• Develop methodologies to enable evaluation of potential benefits and their distribution
• Expand risk/benefit assessments to be more inclusive of multiple types of knowledge and 
expertise through engagement with local communities and other stakeholders
Monitoring and mitigation
• Engage and partner with community members, regulators, and experts to prepare 
monitoring and mitigation plans
• Define conditions under which mitigation strategies should be deployed and prepare 
local infrastructure for potential mitigation efforts
• Openly report field, modeling, and laboratory data on GDO safety and effectiveness 
in field conditions
Published by AAAS
Core commitments for field trials of gene drive organisms
Scott, Jolene T. Sutton, Adam E. Vorsino and Omar S. Akbari
Prasad N. Paradkar, Antoinette J. Piaggio, Jason L. Rasgon, Gordana Rasic, Larisa Rudenko, J. Royden Saah, Maxwell J. 
Lunshof, John M. Marshall, Philipp W. Messer, Craig Montell, Kenneth A. Oye, Megan J. Palmer, Philippos Aris Papathanos,
Heitman, Janet Hemingway, Hirotaka Kanuka, Jennifer Kuzma, James V. Lavery, Yoosook Lee, Marce Lorenzen, Jeantine E. 
Emerson, Kevin Esvelt, Sam Weiss Evans, Robert M. Friedman, Valentino M. Gantz, Fred Gould, Sarah Hartley, Elizabeth
Amit Choudhary, George M. Church, James P. Collins, Kimberly L. Cooper, Jason A. Delborne, Owain R. Edwards, Claudia I. 
Kanya C. Long, Luke Alphey, George J. Annas, Cinnamon S. Bloss, Karl J. Campbell, Jackson Champer, Chun-Hong Chen,
DOI: 10.1126/science.abd1908






This article cites 13 articles, 4 of which you can access for free
PERMISSIONS http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions
Terms of ServiceUse of this article is subject to the 
science.sciencemag.org/content/370/6523/1417/suppl/DC1 
Supplementary Materials for 
Core commitments for field trials of gene drive organisms
 Kanya C. Long, Luke Alphey, George J. Annas, Cinnamon S. Bloss, Karl J. Campbell, 
Jackson Champer, Chun-Hong Chen, Amit Choudhary, George M. Church, James P. Collins, 
Kimberly L. Cooper, Jason A. Delborne, Owain R. Edwards, Claudia I. Emerson, Kevin Esvelt, 
Sam Weiss Evans, Robert M. Friedman, Valentino M. Gantz, Fred Gould, Sarah Hartley, 
Elizabeth Heitman, Janet Hemingway, Hirotaka Kanuka, Jennifer Kuzma, James V. Lavery, 
Yoosook Lee, Marce Lorenzen, Jeantine E. Lunshof, John M. Marshall, Philipp W. Messer, 
Craig Montell, Kenneth A. Oye, Megan J. Palmer, Philippos Aris Papathanos, 
Prasad N. Paradkar, Antoinette J. Piaggio, Jason L. Rasgon, Gordana Rašić, Larisa Rudenko, 
J. Royden Saah, Maxwell J. Scott, Jolene T. Sutton, Adam E. Vorsino, Omar S. Akbari* 
*Corresponding author. Email: oakbari@ucsd.edu
Published 18 December 2020, Science 370, 1417 (2020) 
DOI:  10.1126/science.abd1908 
This PDF file includes: 
Author affiliations
Disclosure statements 
Table 1 with full references 
1 
Author affiliations 
Kanya C. Long1, Luke Alphey2, George J. Annas3, Cinnamon S. Bloss1,4, Karl J. Campbell5, Jackson Champer6, Chun-
Hong Chen7, Amit Choudhary8,9,10, George M. Church11, James P. Collins12, Kimberly L. Cooper13, Jason A. 
Delborne14,15, Owain R Edwards16, Claudia I. Emerson17, Kevin Esvelt18, Sam Weiss Evans19, Robert M. Friedman20, 
Valentino M. Gantz13, Fred Gould15,21, Sarah Hartley22, Elizabeth Heitman23,24, Janet Hemingway25, Hirotaka 
Kanuka26, Jennifer Kuzma15,27, James V. Lavery28,Yoosook Lee29, Marce Lorenzen21, Jeantine E. Lunshof11,30,31, John 
M. Marshall32, Philipp W. Messer6, Craig Montell33, Kenneth A. Oye34, Megan J. Palmer35, Philippos Aris 
Papathanos36, Prasad N. Paradkar37, Antoinette J. Piaggio38, Jason L. Rasgon39, Gordana Rašić40, Larisa Rudenko41, J. 
Royden Saah5,21, Maxwell J. Scott21, Jolene T. Sutton42, Adam E. Vorsino43, Omar S. Akbari13†  
1 Herbert Wertheim School of Public Health and Human Longevity Science, University of California San Diego, La 
Jolla, CA 92093, USA 
2 Arthropod Genetics Group, The Pirbright Institute, Pirbright, Woking, GU24 0NF, UK 
3 Department of Health Law, Policy and Management, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02118 
4 T. Denny Sanford Institute for Empathy and Compassion, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, 
USA 
5 Island Conservation, Puerto Ayora, Galápagos Islands, Ecuador; School of Agriculture and Food Sciences, The 
University of Queensland, Gatton, Australia  
6 Department of Computational Biology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA 
7 National Institute of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes, Miaoli, Taiwan 
8 Chemical Biology and Therapeutics Science, Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA 
9 Department of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02115, USA 
10 Divisions of Renal Medicine and Engineering, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Boston, MA 02115, USA 
11 Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02115, USA 
12 School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA 
13 Division of Biological Sciences, Section of Cell and Developmental Biology, University of California, San Diego, La 
Jolla, CA 92093, USA 
14 Department of Forestry and Environmental Resources, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695, USA 
15 Genetic Engineering and Society Center, North Carolina State University, Raleigh NC, USA 27695, USA 
16 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, Perth, WA 6014, Australia 
17 McMaster University, Institute on Ethics & Policy for Innovation, Department of Philosophy, Hamilton, ON L8S 4L8, 
Canada  
18 Media Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA 
19 Program on Science, Technology and Society, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA 
20 J. Craig Venter Institute, La Jolla, CA 92037, USA 
21 Department of Entomology and Plant Pathology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh NC, USA 27695, USA 
22 Department of Science, Innovation, Technology and Entrepreneurship, University of Exeter Business School, 
Exeter, UK 
23 Program in Ethics in Science and Medicine, University of Texas Southwestern, Dallas, TX 75390, USA 
24 John D. Bower School of Population Health, University of Mississippi Medical Center, Jackson, MS 39216, USA  
25 Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Pembroke Place, Liverpool L3 5QA, UK 
26 Center for Medical Entomology, The Jikei University School of Medicine, Tokyo, Japan 
27 School of Public and International Affairs, North Carolina State University, Raleigh NC, USA 
28 Hubert Department of Global Health, Rollins School of Public Health and Center for Ethics, Emory University, 
Atlanta, GA 30322, USA 
29 Florida Medical Entomology Laboratory, University of Florida, Vero Beach, FL 32962, USA  
30 Department of Global Health and Social Medicine, Harvard Center for Bioethics, Harvard Medical School, Boston, 
MA02115, USA 
31 Department of Genetics, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen, Groningen, The 
Netherlands 





33 Neuroscience Research Institute and Department of Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology, University of 
California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, 93106, USA 
34 Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA 
35 Department of Bioengineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA 
36 Department of Entomology, Robert H. Smith Faculty of Agriculture, Food and Environment, Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Rehovot 7610001, Israel 
37 CSIRO Health and Biosecurity, Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness, Geelong, VIC 3220, Australia 
38 United States Department of Agriculture, Animal Plant Health Inspection Services, Wildlife Services, National 
Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins, CO, 80521, USA 
39 Department of Entomology, The Center for Infectious Disease Dynamics, and the Huck Institutes of the Life 
Sciences, The Pennsylvania State University, W127 Millennium Science Complex, University Park, PA 16802, USA 
40 Mosquito Control Laboratory, QIMR Berghofer Medical Research Institute, Herston, QLD 4006, Australia 
41 Program on Emerging Technologies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA 
42 University of Hawaii at Hilo, Hilo, HI 96720, USA 
43 United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Pacific Islands Fish and Wildlife Office, Honolulu, HI 96850, USA 
 
† To whom correspondence should be addressed: Omar S. Akbari, Division of Biological Sciences, Section of Cell 






A Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Safe Genes Program Grant (HR0011-17-2-0047) was 
awarded to O.S.A. and supports the work of K.C.L. O.S.A is a founder of Agragene, Inc., has an equity interest, and 
serves on the company’s Scientific Advisory Board. L.A. is supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (INV-
008549) and the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBS/E/I/00007033 and 
BBS/E/I/00007034). C.B. is a member of NIH Novel and Exceptional Technology and Research Advisory Committee 
(NExTRAC) and Co-Chair of the NExTRAC Gene Drives in Biomedical Research Working Group. K.L.C. is a member of 
the Scientific Advisory Board for Synbal, Inc. C.I.E. is supported by a grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, and the funders had no role or decision in C.I.E.’s authorship. K.E. is the author of patents on diverse 
gene drive technologies with Harvard University and MIT. S.W.E received funding from the Schmidt Futures 
Foundation and sits on an advisory panel for the DARPA program that funded K.C.L. and O.S.A., but did not directly 
receive funding from DARPA. V.M.G. is a founder of and has equity interests in Synbal, Inc. and Agragene, Inc., 
companies that may potentially benefit from the research results. V.M.G. also serves on both the company's 
Scientific Advisory Board and the Board of Directors of Synbal, Inc. The terms of this arrangement have been 
reviewed and approved by the University of California, San Diego, in accordance with its conflict-of-interest 
policies. S.H. is funded by British Academy grants KF400306 and KF2\100179. E.H. is funded by USDA grant “Gene 
Drive Applications to Agriculture in Texas: Knowledge, Perceptions, and Values” (USDA Project # 2018-67023-
27676), but this publication is not directly related to the work supported by that funding; and is an ad hoc member 
the NExTRAC Gene Drives in Biomedical Research Working Group. M.J.P. received research funding support from 
the Open Philanthropy Project and the Smith Richardson Foundation on related topics, but this funding did not 
directly support her participation in this paper; received honoraria from the Nuclear Threat Initiative Biosecurity 
Innovation and Risk Reduction Initiative and Ginkgo Bioworks; and serves in various unpaid/volunteer roles at 
Revive & Restore, Engineering Biology Research Consortium, International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) 
Competition, run by the iGEM Foundation, World Economic Forum Global Future Council on Synthetic Biology, NSF 
Center for Cellular Construction, Synthetic Biology Program at the Joint Genomics Institute, Biosecurity Task Force 
of the American Biosafety Association, and Research and Health Department of the World Health Organization 
Science Division. L.R. is co-founder of BioPolicy Solutions; there are no financial conflicts of interest associated with 
this work. R.S. coordinates the Genetic Biocontrol of Invasive Rodents Program, contributes to the Outreach 
Network for Gene Drive Research and World Health Organization Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network, 
participated in the 2019 NIH Gene Drive Research Forum, has contributed to work by Revive & Restore, and owns a 
consulting company Health Preparedness and Crisis Management and mutual funds with S&P500 holdings; there 
are no known conflicts of interest associated with these activities. 
 
Table 1 with full references 







Linked-homing#(2, 4, 18–21), Medea (22–












Daisy#(34), split-homing#(1, 3, 35–37), 




Non-Drives SIT#(42), RIDL#(43), 
fsRIDL#(44),  pgSIT#(45) 
Table 1. Characteristics and examples of engineered population control technologies. Two broad types of 
engineered approaches exist to modify populations—one requires gene drive and the other relies on non-drive 
technologies. Multiple examples of these types of systems exist, which can have varied temporal dynamics including: 
Self-propagating with a low threshold (predicted to spread from a small release), to majority wins with a high 
threshold (predicted to spread into a population only when the transgene is present at  >50%), to self-limiting which 
are temporally limited (can only spread or persist in population for a short period). These systems can fall under two 
broad categories from non-localized (predicted to spread beyond boundaries) to localized (predicted to spread 
within a localized population). For more details on the various examples and terminology see associated references. 
#Can be used for population suppression in some forms. *While UDMEL does have a high threshold it does not always 
fall under “majority wins” temporal dynamics. Abbreviations: Medea, maternal effect dominant embryonic arrest; 
TARE/TADE, toxin-antidote recessive embryo/toxin-antidote dominant embryo; CleaveR, Cleve and Rescue; UDMEL, 
maternal effect lethal underdominance; SIT, sterile insect technique; RIDL, release of insects carrying a dominant 
lethal; fsRIDL, female-specific release of insects carrying a dominant lethal; pgSIT, precision-guided sterile insect 
technique.  
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